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Industrialization, Productive Capacity and the Endogeneity of Fiscal Space

Author(s): 
Jacob Assa
Marc Morgan

Most debates on funding development in general, and industrialization in particular, take finance to be exogenous to the process of development, either coming from abroad (as ODA, FDI, or remittances) or from ‘independent’ domestic sources (such as taxes and borrowing). This view sees finance as a passive resource which needs to be ‘mobilized’, in the language of the SDGs. History, by contrast, shows that no country has ever industrialized relying solely on such exogenous, passive financing. Successful economies, from Renaissance Italian city-states to modern day China, have all used developmental policies backed endogenously by active finance to jumpstart and sustain development. Finance, from this perspective, is not ‘for’ development, but rather ‘from’ development, that is, from utilizing existing domestic monetary sovereignty to increase domestic productive capacity and industrialize, and thus enhance the fiscal space to absorb (or ‘finance’ in real resource terms) industrialization. This implies that a country’s fiscal space is not given in absolute terms, but is rather relative to its productive capacity, i.e., the capacity in the quantity of real resources to absorb monetary spending.

The question we address in this paper is how we can quantify the fiscal space that countries have and can dispose of, and what the binding constraints are to increasing this space, or even using it. We first construct a novel Monetary Sovereignty Index (MSI) following the idea of sovereignty (or dependence) as a spectrum. Countries that issue their currency and do not peg it to another currency score higher on the index, as do countries that have lower dependence on imports of food and energy, higher foreign exchange reserves and lower external debt. We then plot the MSI against UNCTAD’s Productive Capacity Index (PCI) and show how the four resulting quadrants imply four different development paths (for countries with high scores on both indices, low scores on both, or high on one and low on another). Finally, we combine these two long-term indices (using principal component analysis) with two short-term indicators – the rates of labor underutilization and inflation – to quantify how much fiscal space each country has. We find a wide variation of unused fiscal space in Africa, from very little in Zimbabwe, to quite a lot in Southern Africa. We conclude by discussing the geopolitical economy factors that are at the root of countries not using their dynamic fiscal space to its fullest.